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MARKET POWER AND AMERICAN
EXPRESS
John B. Kirkwood*
The Second Circuit ruled that American Express did not have
market power because it operated in a two-sided market and any
leverage it exercised over merchants derived from its successful
competition for cardholders. As a result, the relevant market had
to include both sides of a credit card transaction, the company’s
market share was modest, and it could not exploit both merchants
and cardholders. In Market Power and Antitrust Enforcement
(forthcoming in B.U. L. REV.), I propose a new approach that
infers market power from the likely effects of the challenged
conduct. This approach shows that American Express clearly
exercised market power. Its conduct prevented merchants from
steering customers to cheaper credit cards and thus maintained
merchant fees above the competitive level. I also explain why these
high fees were not justified by the rewards programs the company
provided to its cardholders.
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INTRODUCTION
The federal government and seventeen states sued American Express
(“Amex”) because it insisted on inserting anti–steering provisions in its
contracts with merchants.1 These provisions prohibited merchants from
inducing a consumer with an Amex credit card to use another credit card
with a lower merchant fee.2 The antitrust concern with these provisions
was obvious: they removed the incentive for a competing credit card
company to cut its merchant fees since a merchant could not steer
additional business to it if it did so. Amex’s anti–steering provisions, in
short, were a restraint on price competition.
In order to challenge such a restraint, the plaintiffs had to show that
Amex had market power. The anti–steering provisions were vertical
restraints—embodied in agreements between Amex and its customers
(merchants), not between Amex and its competitors—and a vertical
restraint cannot be condemned unless the court can find market power. Put
differently, vertical restraints must be evaluated under the Rule of
Reason,3 and the first step of this balancing test requires direct or indirect
proof of market power.4 The issue appeared complex because the market
is two–sided (a credit card company deals with merchants on one side and
cardholders on the other) and the sides are interrelated (Amex’s value to
merchants depends on its value to cardholders). Under these
circumstances, market definition—the traditional first step in market
power determination—is difficult, and the lower courts split.5
This Article suggests a better way. In Market Power and Antitrust
Enforcement,6 I propose that courts infer market power (and its larger
variant, monopoly power) from the likely effects of the challenged
conduct. Specifically, courts should find market power if the challenged
conduct is likely to cause prices to increase significantly above the
prevailing level or to prevent prices from falling significantly to the but–
for level, the level that would exist in the absence of the challenged
conduct.7 This approach has numerous advantages over the traditional
1

See generally United States v. American Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d 143 (E.D.N.Y.
2015), rev’d, 838 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2016), cert. granted sub nom. Ohio v. American
Express Co. (U.S. Oct. 16, 2017) (No. 16–1454).
2
See American Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d at 160–67 (describing what Amex calls
Non–Discrimination Provisions (“NDPs”)).
3
See id. at 167.
4
See id. at 168–69 (indicating that a plaintiff can show either that the defendant had
market power or that the restraint caused actual anticompetitive effects from which market
power can be inferred).
5
See infra Part II.
6
John B. Kirkwood, Market Power and Antitrust Enforcement, 98 B.U. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2018), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2942315.
7
If the price change is likely to be substantial, the court should find monopoly power.
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approach, as my earlier article demonstrates. In this Article, I show that it
also simplifies the determination of Amex’s market power.
Part I of the Article defines market power and briefly describes the
traditional ways of proving it. Part I also sets forth my new approach and
summarizes the reasons why it is preferable to the traditional approach.
Part II applies this new approach to American Express. It concludes that
Amex plainly exercised market power by adopting anti–steering
provisions that allowed it to maintain merchant fees significantly above
the but–for level. Part III addresses the customary approach to identifying
market power—defining a relevant market and measuring the defendant’s
market share—and explains that while it is suggestive of Amex’s market
power, it cannot resolve the issue. Part IV analyzes Amex’s asserted
justifications and find them inadequate. Amex argued, in essence, that its
higher merchant fees funded its generous rewards programs, but absent a
market failure this non–price benefit cannot excuse a restraint on price
competition.

I.

MARKET POWER

While judges and scholars may differ in their readiness to find market
power, they do not dispute what it is. Market power is the power to
profitably raise price above the competitive level. This definition appears
in the classic articles,8 the leading economics textbook on industrial
organization,9 and the vast majority of the cases that define market
power.10 But despite its widespread acceptance, this definition is
incomplete: it does not specify the competitive level. That is a serious
problem since one cannot rigorously say that a firm has market power
unless one can identify the competitive level and show that the firm’s price
exceeds it.
Antitrust has never fully solved this problem. Many scholars have
argued, as Amex does in this case, that marginal cost (the short–run cost
8

See William Landes & Richard A. Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 HARV.
L. REV. 937, 937 (1981); Louis Kaplow, Why (Ever) Define Markets?, 124 HARV. L. REV.
437, 444 (2010).
9
See Dennis W. Carlton & Jeffrey M. Perloff, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 119
(4th ed. 2005).
10
See, e.g., Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209,
235 (1993) (referring to the ability “to exert market power” by raising “prices above a
competitive level”); NCAA v. Board of Regents of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 108 n.38 (1984)
(“Market power is the ability to raise prices above those that would be charged in a
competitive market.”); Novell, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 731 F.3d 1064, 1070 (10th Cir.
2013) (Gorsuch, J.) (“To prevail on a section 2 claim, a plaintiff generally must show the
defendant possessed sufficient market power to raise prices substantially above a
competitive level without losing so much business that the gambit becomes unprofitable.”).
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of producing one additional unit) is the competitive level,11 since price
would equal marginal cost if the market was “perfectly competitive.”12 But
marginal cost is difficult to calculate and, more importantly, marginal cost
pricing is infeasible in many industries (e.g., media, prescription drugs,
and software).13 For example, the marginal cost of downloading one
additional copy of Windows is essentially zero.14 If Microsoft had to sell
Windows at marginal cost, it could not afford the research and
development necessary to create it. Some scholars have therefore argued
that a better measure of the competitive level is full economic cost (the
opportunity cost of all inputs, including financial capital), which is
equivalent to an economic profits test. Yet that measure is even more
difficult to calculate than marginal cost.15
Because of these flaws, courts virtually never determine market power
by calculating the defendant’s marginal cost or full economic cost and
comparing that figure to its price. Instead, they define a “relevant market”
and measure the defendant’s share of that market.16 This approach—the
market definition/market share paradigm—is the presumptive, if not
obligatory, method of measuring market power in antitrust law.17 In
theory, it may be skipped if the plaintiff establishes that the defendant’s
conduct has caused actual anticompetitive effects.18 But in practice, courts
11

See, e.g., Brief for American Express in Opposition at 40, Ohio v. American Express
Co., No. 16–1454 (U.S. Aug. 21, 2017) [hereinafter Brief for Respondent]; Phillip E.
Areeda, Herbert Hovenkamp & John L. Solow, IIB ANTITRUST LAW 147 (3d ed. 2007)
[hereinafter AREEDA–HOVENKAMP TREATISE]; Carlton & Perloff, supra note 9, at 119.
12
F.M. Scherer & David Ross, INDUST. MKT. STRUCTURE AND ECON. PERFORMANCE 20
(3d ed. 1990).
13
See Kirkwood, supra note 6, at 18–19.
14
See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 79 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
15
See Kirkwood, supra note 6, at 21–25.
16
See AREEDA–HOVENKAMP TREATISE, supra note 11, at 114 (“Instead of trying to
measure the degree by which a profit–maximizing monopoly price exceeds the competitive
price, courts traditionally attempt to infer market power from the defendant(s)’ market
share.”).
17
Some decisions indicate that market definition is necessary. See, e.g., Walker Process
Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 177 (1965) (“Without a
definition of [the relevant] market there is no way to measure [defendant’s] ability to lessen
or destroy competition.”); McWane, Inc. v. FTC, 783 F.3d 814, 828 (11th Cir. 2015)
(“Defining the market is a necessary step in any analysis of market power . . . .”) (quoting
U.S. Anchor Mfg., Inc. v. Rule Indus., Inc., 7 F.3d 986, 994 (11th Cir. 1993)). Other
decisions state that market definition is the ordinary or first step in determining market
power. See, e.g., Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 431 F.3d 917, 935 (6th Cir.
2005) (“The existence of such power ordinarily is inferred from the seller’s possession of
a predominant share of the market.”) (quoting Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech Servs.
Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 464 (1992); Geneva Pharm. Tech. Corp. v. Barr Labs. Inc., 386 F.3d
485, 496 (2d Cir. 2004) (“Evaluating market power begins with defining the relevant
market.”).
18
See, e.g., American Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d at 168–69.
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never skip it. No court to my knowledge has ever resolved the market
power issue without at least a rough market definition. Moreover,
whenever courts describe the amount of market power required for a
particular antitrust violation, they always describe it in terms of a
minimum market share.19 Yet such a heavy reliance on market definition
is deeply questionable. In many circumstances, market definition is
complex and uncertain, making the resulting market share finding
unreliable.20 Some scholars want to do away with market definition
altogether.21 At oral argument in American Express, Justice Breyer
referred to it as “one of the most difficult problems in antitrust law.”22
The approach I propose would avoid these difficulties. In the ordinary
case, courts would not calculate costs or define a market; they would
instead focus on the central issue in an antitrust case—the challenged
conduct. They would find market power if the challenged conduct is likely
to raise price significantly above the prevailing level or prevent price from
declining significantly to the but–for level.23 This approach would have
major benefits for antitrust enforcement, since it would streamline antitrust
litigation by allowing tribunals to resolve two critical issues—market
power and anticompetitive effects—at the same time, while inferring the
relevant market from the result. Courts follow this approach now
whenever they determine that the challenged conduct has caused actual
anticompetitive effects. But where the effects of the disputed conduct are
probable, rather than actual, courts very rarely infer market power from
those effects. In particular, no court, to my knowledge, has identified the
but–for level and concluded that the defendant exercised market power
because its conduct prevented price from falling to that level. In American
Express, however, the but–for level provides a simple and accurate
measure of Amex’s market power.

19

See Louis Kaplow, Market Definition and the Merger Guidelines, 39 REV. IND. ORG.
107, 111 (2011) (“All [guidelines, court opinions, legal treatises, or other sources] state
that there is a market power requirement, and all denominate it in terms of [market
share].”).
20
See Kirkwood, supra note 6, at 9–10, 43–45.
21
See Kaplow, supra note 8, at 440 (“[T]he market definition process should be
abandoned.”).
22
See Transcript of Oral Argument at 43, Ohio v. American Express Co., No.16–1454,
(U.S. Feb. 26, 2018) (adding that “the answer to that [depends] on a lot of different
circumstances and what you’re up to.”).
23
If the challenged conduct would substantially raise price or forestall a substantial
price decline, the court would find monopoly power.
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MARKET POWER IN AMERICAN EXPRESS

It is clear that Amex’s anti–steering provisions enabled Amex and the
other credit card companies to hold merchant fees significantly above the
but–for level, the level that would exist without those provisions. Had
merchants been able to steer their customers to credit cards with lower
merchant fees, then other credit card companies would have had a
financial incentive to lower their fees and Amex would have faced
increased pressure to lower its own.24 The result would be significantly
lower merchant fees and consumer prices.25 In short, the anti–steering
provisions allowed Amex to exercise market power.
To be sure, lower fees would make it more difficult for Amex to fund
its rewards programs. Indeed, Amex contends that its generous incentive
programs justify the higher merchant fees since the fees directly benefit
consumers who use its card. But regardless of whether that is a legitimate
justification, there is no doubt that Amex’s merchant fees are greater than
they would be without the provisions. That is its goal. Amex’s very
justification for its anti–steering provisions assumes that higher merchant
fees will result.
This fundamental fact—that the NDPs allow Amex to maintain
elevated merchant fees—is widely recognized. Amex itself acknowledged
it. In its brief to the Supreme Court, it asserted that its rewards programs
are “funded by higher merchant fees.”26 Amex also acknowledged that
without its anti–steering provisions, fees would be lower since “steering
reflects merchants’ preference for lower fees . . . .”27 Likewise, Amex
executives testified that if steering was allowed, Amex “would face
increased pressure to reduce its rates.”28 As a result, the district court found
that Amex’s restraints have resulted in “higher all–in merchant prices
across the network services market . . . .”29 If the restraints were
abolished, the “restoration of downward competitive pressure on merchant
prices would . . . result in lower swipe fees charged to merchants by
American Express and its competitors.”30 Even the Second Circuit, which
24

See American Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d at 207 (“[B]y disrupting the price–setting
mechanism ordinarily present in competitive markets, the NDPs reduce American
Express’s incentive—as well as those of Visa, MasterCard, and Discover—to offer
merchants lower discount rates . . . .”).
25
See id. at 213 (finding that the anti–steering provisions “[i]mpede modes of
competition that likely would benefit consumers on both sides of the GPCC platform.”).
26
Brief for Respondent, supra note 11, at 28.
27
Id. at 29.
28
American Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d at 220.
29
Id. at 215.
30
Id. at 219; see also id. at 230 (“Without the NDPs in place, . . . ‘Discover would
aggressively pursue a strategy of lowering [its] prices and providing incentive to merchants
that would steer incremental volume to Discover.’”) (quoting a Discover executive).
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thought that Amex’s higher fees were needed to fund its rewards
programs,31 agreed that its merchant fees were higher as a result of its anti–
steering provisions. These provisions, the court stated, protect “the
critically important revenue that Amex receives from its relatively high
merchant fees.”32
In sum, it is plain that Amex exercised market power. It adopted anti–
steering provisions that crippled price competition between the credit card
networks, which allowed Amex and its competitors to hold their merchant
fees above the competitive level—the but–for level. It makes no difference
to this conclusion that Amex funneled the extra revenues it received from
its higher merchant fees into its incentive programs. While that diversion
might justify the higher fees—a questionable proposition discussed
below—it does not negate the fact that the challenged conduct enabled
Amex to maintain its merchant fees above the competitive level, the
essence of market power.

III.

MARKET DEFINITION AND MARKET SHARE

The district court began its analysis of market power by defining a
relevant market, calculating Amex’s share of that market, and citing a
factor (“cardholder insistence”) that suggests Amex has more market
power than its share alone would dictate.33 This is the traditional approach
to power determination and, as noted earlier, it is often fraught with
difficulties. The first major issue in American Express was whether the
relevant market should be limited to the provision of services to merchants
or also include the other side of this two–sided industry, the provision of
services to cardholders. The district court limited the market to the
merchant side and the Second Circuit held that this was a fatal error. The
relevant market must include both sets of Amex’s customers: cardholders
and merchants.34
The appellate court’s reasoning is incorrect. The ultimate issue is
whether Amex has the power to charge a price above the competitive level.
If that is true for one set of its customers, it does not matter that it is not
true for another set. If the benefits Amex furnishes to the second set
(cardholders) outweigh the harm it imposes on the first set (merchants),
Amex’s behavior may be legitimate. But that does not negate the
31

See United States v. American Express Co., 838 F.3d 179, 206 (2d Cir. 2016)
(“Though merchants may desire lower fees, those fees are necessary to maintain cardholder
satisfaction . . . .”).
32
Id. at 205.
33
See American Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d at 170–95.
34
See American Express Co., 838 F.3d at 196–97.
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conclusion that Amex exercises market power over the first set. In
addition, as the United States explains in detail, markets are defined by
goods or services that are reasonable substitutes for each other, and
cardholder services are not substitutes for merchant services.35
The second major issue was whether Amex could exercise market
power when its share of total transaction volume was just 26.4%. Since a
credit card transaction simultaneously involves both a cardholder and a
merchant, the parties and the courts thought that 26.4% was a fair measure
of Amex’s market share regardless of whether the relevant market was
limited to merchant services or included both merchant services and
cardholder services. The problem was that courts do not normally regard
a 26.4% share as sufficient to confer market power.36 In this instance, the
district court was willing to make an exception because so many of
Amex’s cardholders insist on using their Amex card. When coupled with
other factors (high barriers and a concentrated industry), this “cardholder
insistence” allowed an inference of market power.37
The Second Circuit rejected this conclusion because cardholder
insistence is driven by the generosity of Amex’s rewards programs.38
Without those, Amex’s appeal to both cardholders and merchants would
dissipate. Because Amex must continue to invest in its rewards programs
in order to preserve its market share and brand appeal, it cannot exercise
market power; to the contrary, its ability to charge high merchant fees
requires that it continuously compete for cardholders.39
This reasoning, though plausible on the surface, is mistaken. Any firm
with a distinctive product must invest in maintaining the distinctive
features of that product in order to preserve its appeal.40 By itself, that
investment in product quality neither proves nor disproves the existence
of market power. To resolve that issue, one has to go back to the definition
of market power—the ability to profitably price above the competitive
35

See Brief of United States as Respondent Supporting Petitioners at 35–40, Ohio v.
American Express Co., No. 16–1454 (U.S. Dec. 7, 2017) [hereinafter Brief for United
States].
36
See Brief for Respondent, supra note 11, at 37.
37
The court also relied on evidence of actual anticompetitive effects. See American
Express, 88 F. Supp. 3d at 188 (“[Amex’s] ability to impose significant price increases . . .
without any meaningful merchant attrition.”).
38
See American Express Co., 838 F.3d at 202–03.
39
See id. at 203 (“That Amex might not enjoy market power without continuing
investment in cardholder benefits indicates, if anything, a lack of market power.”).
40
See American Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d at 195 (“American Express cannot avert a
finding of market power premised on cardholder insistence merely because that loyalty and
its current market share would dissipate if the company were to stop investing in those
programs that make its product valuable to cardholders. Of course it would, as would the
share of any company that abandoned a core element of a successful business model.”).
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level. Amex has market power if it can price profitably above marginal
cost or, better yet (given the problems with marginal cost), full economic
cost.41 Accordingly, the question is not whether Amex needs to invest in
rewards programs or other features of its product to maintain cardholder
insistence, but whether that investment, and the resulting cardholder
insistence, gives it the ability to price above marginal cost or full economic
cost. Unfortunately, none of the parties addressed that issue.42 As a result,
it is not possible to determine whether Amex’s market share, coupled with
cardholder insistence, allowed it to price above the competitive level.
Once again, the traditional tools for evaluating market power come up
short. It is much easier to decide whether Amex’s exclusionary conduct
enabled it to maintain merchant fees above the but–for level.

IV.

JUSTIFICATION

Amex contends that even if its anti–steering provisions allow it to
exercise market power, the higher merchant fees that result are justified by
the rewards programs they support. In other words, even if its NDPs
produce supracompetitive merchant fees, Amex funnels the extra revenue
into rewards programs for its cardholders, benefiting them and increasing
non–price rivalry among credit cards.
This asserted justification faces two initial difficulties and a
fundamental objection. First, Amex has not poured all the revenue it
receives from its merchant fees into its rewards programs.43 As a result,
the losses it imposes on merchants are not fully offset by the benefits it
provides to cardholders. Second, the higher merchant fees that Amex and
the rest of the industry charge are passed on to consumers in the form of

41

It makes sense to use cost–based measures of the competitive level here because the
issue is not whether the challenged conduct gave Amex market power but whether its need
to invest in product quality shows that it did not possess market power. That is not so.
Amex would have market power if its investment enabled it to price above cost.
42
See American Express Co., 838 F.3d at 205–06 (“A finding that not every dime of
merchant fees is passed along to cardholders says nothing about other expenses that Amex
faces, let alone whether its profit margin is abnormally high . . . . Plaintiffs might have met
their initial burden under the rule of reason by showing . . . that Amex’s pricing was set
above competitive levels within the credit–card industry (i.e., supracompetitive pricing).
At trial, however, they offered no such proof.”).
43
See id. at 205 (“Indeed, evidence on the record suggests—and Amex conceded at oral
argument—that not all of Amex’s gains from increased merchant fees are passed along to
cardholders in the form of rewards.”); see also American Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d at
216 (“[Plaintiffs’ expert] further concluded that American Express spends less than half of
the discount fees it collects from merchants on cardholder rewards.”).
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higher retail prices,44 and many consumers who pay those prices use cash,
checks, debit cards, or credit cards with few if any rewards.45 These
consumers are unambiguously hurt by the anti–steering provisions. They
pay higher prices but receive little or nothing in return.
The fundamental objection to this asserted justification is that it
assumes it is acceptable to force one set of customers to pay higher prices
so long as the revenues are distributed to another set of customers in the
form of non–price benefits. That is incorrect. A robber who took $100
from one person cannot excuse the theft because he later gave the $100 to
another person. The coerced transfer of wealth from the victim to the
robber is itself the crime. Similarly, a group of competitors cannot agree
to raise prices to certain consumers and then justify their collusion on the
ground that they provided an equivalent amount of “rewards” to other
consumers. Such conduct is also a coerced transfer of wealth, and it
distorts the competitive process. Instead of letting competition decide
whether consumers prefer lower prices and lower rewards to higher prices
and higher rewards, the colluders have made the choice themselves.46
The only way to justify a restraint that produces higher prices and
greater non–price benefits, like the anti–steering provisions, is to show that
the market is subject to a market failure—an imperfection that prevents it
from maximizing consumer welfare—and that the restraint corrects this
market failure in the least restrictive way possible and thereby improves
consumer welfare. 47 If that is true, the restraint does not distort the
competitive process, but rather enhances it. Amex did attempt to show a
market failure at the trial level. It alleged that some of its merchant services
and some of its investments in product quality were subject to free–riding,
an externality that can stunt competition. The district court rejected all of
Amex’s free–riding theories,48 however, and Amex did not appeal from
these conclusions.
44
See American Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d at 216 (“Merchants facing increased credit
card acceptance costs will pass most, if not all, of their additional costs along to their
customers in the form of higher retail prices.”).
45
See id. (“Higher retail prices affect not only those customers who use American
Express cards, but also shoppers who instead prefer to pay using a lower–reward GPCC
card, debit card, check, or cash.”).
46
See Brief of Amicus Curiae Economists in Support of Certiorari at 6, Ohio v.
American Express Co., No. 16–1454 (U.S. Jul. 6 2017) (“Nearly any firm dealing with
merchants could offer the appellate court’s improper analysis that a restraint that raises the
firms’ wholesale price to the merchants passes antitrust muster as long as the restraint
provides the firm with revenue that it spends on enhancing the quality of the products if
offers to the ‘other side.’”).
47
If there were no market failure, unrestricted competition would best promote
consumer welfare.
48
See American Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d at 234–38.
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At the Supreme Court, Amex argued that its anti–steering provisions
were essential to its business strategy. But that hardly justifies them. The
issue is not what works best for Amex; the issue is what works best for
consumers. And absent a market failure, a competitive market produces
the optimal results for consumers; Amex’s restraints would only interfere
with this process.49 Amex also argued that output—credit card transaction
volume—has exploded over the last decade, which suggests that
consumers prefer a market subject to anti–steering provisions. At oral
argument, Justice Gorsuch emphasized this output increase in his
aggressive questioning of plaintiffs’ counsel.50 As Chief Justice Roberts
pointed out, however, Amex had not proved that the output increase was
caused by its anti–steering provisions, as opposed to more general
macroeconomic factors like GDP growth or consumer confidence.51 As a
result, the rise in credit card transaction volume does not establish that the
NDPs improved overall consumer welfare.52

CONCLUSION
Amex convinced the Second Circuit that it does not have market
power because its leverage over merchants comes from the rewards and
prestige it provides to its cardholders. Its anti–steering provisions do not
reduce competition because Amex uses the higher merchant fees they
generate to fund its rewards programs. In short, its power in the
marketplace is constrained—indeed, eliminated—by the need to compete
for cardholders. That view is incorrect. If market power is determined, as
it ought to be, by the effects of the challenged conduct, then it is clear that
Amex possesses market power. By its own admission, its anti–steering
provisions have allowed it to maintain merchant fees significantly above
the but–for level, the level that unrestricted competition would have
produced.
49

See Brief for United States, supra note 35, at 45–46 (“Under the Sherman Act, . . .
the optimal mix of goods and services is set through market competition . . . . As the
leading treatise explains, the Second Circuit erred in this case by failing to recognize that
‘under antitrust policy competition should choose the optimal mix of revenue as between
the two sides’ of Amex’s platform.”).
50
See Transcript of Oral Argument at 4, Ohio v. American Express Co., (U.S. Feb. 26,
2017) (No.16–1454) (“[T]here’s no evidence of restricted output in this case, correct?”).
51
See id. at 41 (“Output of the product has increased, that has so many factors that go
into that besides the nature of the particular product, right? I mean, if the economy grows,
then the output of your product, credit card transactions, grows, right?”) (Roberts, C.J.).
52
See Reply Brief for the United States at 17, Ohio v. American Express Co., No. 16–
1454 (U.S. Feb. 15, 2018) (noting that “transaction volume is influenced by many factors”
and that transaction volume grew rapidly following Australia’s prohibition of anti–steering
rules).
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Amex argues that even if it did impose supracompetitive prices on
merchants—and thereby exercise market power—its conduct promoted
rather than reduced competition because it enabled Amex to provide
generous rewards programs that benefited its cardholders. But absent a
market failure (and Amex could not establish a significant one at trial),
higher cardholder rewards cannot justify the exploitation of merchants.
Any time a defendant, or group of defendants, adopts a restraint that raises
price to one set of customers, it can funnel the proceeds to another set of
customers in the form of non–price benefits. But that does not excuse the
restraint. It forces the first set of customers to pay a supracompetitive price
and prevents the competitive process from deciding whether customers as
a whole (or particular sets of customers) would prefer lower prices and
lower rewards to higher prices and greater rewards.



